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Abstract 
 
The social contract has become the dominant basis for political society, yet political theology is still 
prevalent in many countries. Rene Girard’s theory of human nature as involving mimesis and ritual 
offers a more sufficient account for this continuity than that of the social contract theorists. This paper 
will demonstrate how the views of human nature and the formation of society given by Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau not only failed to account for our religious and ritualistic aspects, but provided a 
basis for the evolution of the social contract into a pragmatic contract. Originally it was conceived as 
predicated upon natural rights; but the pragmatic use creates arbitrary rights agreed upon by a society. 
When considered in light of humanity’s imitative and rivalistic tendencies, this poses a serious worry. 
Girard’s theory provides the understanding that society isn’t only predicated upon agreement, but also 
upon imitation, religion, and ritual. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This paper will critique the social contract theorists’ conceptions of human nature and 
the formation of society through Rene Girard’s theories of mimesis, scapegoating, 
and ritual. Girard’s views account for the continuance and prevalence of political 
theology; conversely the current conception of the social contract deprives those 
situated in western democracy of any such account of political theology.  Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau proposed varying theories regarding the content, legitimacy, 
and purpose of the social contract. Their methods introduced pragmatic approaches to 
structuring political institutions, approaches that eventually rendered appeals to 
natural rights arbitrary. Girard’s theories of mimetic desire, scapegoating, and the 
ritualistic basis of society critique the intellectual traditions of each social contract 
theorist. The rationalistic, pragmatic approach to political authority influenced by 
Hobbes fails to recognize the role of ritual and spirituality in the origins of society. 
Locke’s view of property rights as the grounds of the social contract is ultimately 
refuted by the pragmatic approach and is ignorant of the mimetic nature of desire; 
rational agreement is an insufficient means for preventing mimetic tensions regarding 
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property. Rousseau’s view of the independence of man is blind to man’s dependence 
on imitation and tradition. A Girardian critique of the social contract theories 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of the continued prevalence of 
political theology. 
 
The Social Contract & Pragmatism 
 
Thomas Hobbes claims the social contract is necessary in order to maintain the social 
order and prevent a violent state of nature. He writes, “the passions that incline men 
to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious 
living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them.”1 Fear of losing one’s life or 
comfort is necessary for humanity to be inclined to pursue peace. However, though 
we pursue peace, we also do all we can to defend ourselves.2 According to Hobbes, 
this drives societies to enter into social contracts to protect these interests, but in order 
for such an agreement to be successful, it must be enforced by a common, absolutely 
sovereign power: the leviathan. This agreement to submit to the leviathan is necessary 
due to Hobbes’ conception of man’s existence in the state of nature as “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short”3 due to his fickle and violent nature.  
 
John Locke conceived of the purpose of this formation of society as a method of 
preserving the natural rights of those who enter into it. He refers to such a society as a 
common wealth; an independent community that comes together with the consent of 
each individual.4 Locke’s view of the purpose of such a common wealth originates in 
his conception of ‘property of person’.  
 
“The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided… 
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property.”5  
 
An individual is the proprietor of their own body, and, by extension, the proprietor 
over anything on which they labor. Lockean natural rights such as life, liberty, and 
property are such extensions of self-proprietorship. A common wealth is primarily 
concerned with the preservation of personal property; its conception is for this 
                                                          
1 Hobbes, Leviathan, XIII. 
 
2 Ibid, XIV. 
 
3 Ibid, XIII. 
 
4 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 52. 
 
5 Ibid, 66. 
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purpose. Common wealths, “by compact and agreement, settled the property which 
labour and industry began… either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to 
the land in the others possession”6. 
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau conceives of the social contract as a matter of convenience, 
predicated on the autonomy of the individual. He asserts the independence of man; 
“once the children are freed from the obedience they owed the father and their father 
is freed from the care he owed his children, all return equally to independence.”7 The 
family is the only natural society, yet it’s predicated on temporary need and would 
proceed to remain “only by means of convention.”8 Humans are characterized by their 
common liberty. They are driven to enter into a social contract, not by violence and 
fear of each other, but by fear of nature. Humanity reaches “the point where obstacles 
that are harmful to their maintenance in the state of nature gain the upper hand by 
their resistance to the forces that each individual can bring to bear to maintain himself 
in that state.”9 It becomes evident that one might not be able to survive 
independently; therefore it becomes advantageous to “form by aggregation a sum of 
forces that could gain the upper hand over the resistance.”10 Rousseau holds that 
government is only legitimized by the consent of every individual due to the natural 
autonomy of each; the general will. 
 
Considering the influence of these theories in modern politics and philosophy will 
demonstrate the following points. First, that the social contract theories encouraged a 
more pragmatic approach to politics and government. Second, that the resultant 
approach reduces notions of natural rights and freedom to mechanisms of the social 
contract, rather than principles the contract is predicated upon. Third, this pragmatic 
approach influenced by the social contract thinkers produces the view that the 
formation of community and peace consists in a rational agreement. 
 
Mark Lilla’s article, The Politics of God, recognizes such pragmatic tendencies. 
Division and violence produced by religious war prompted Hobbes to “plant a seed, a 
thought that it might be possible to build legitimate political institutions without 
grounding them on divine revelation.”11 He asserts that peace is to be found through 
government structure rather than through a religion that legitimizes it. Locke similarly 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 67.  
7 Rousseau, Basic Political Writings, 142. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid, 147. 
 
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Lilla, The Politics of God, 4. 
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advocates for the social contract because it is useful for protecting property, while 
Rousseau sees its value in maintaining mankind’s independence while allowing them 
to maintain themselves. Though Rousseau valued religion, he didn’t necessarily 
search for a divine principle; “…all particular religions are good when one serves 
God usefully in them.”12 
 
The social contract theorists were not pure pragmatists, but their ideas prepared the 
way for such thought. Though Locke and Rousseau do appeal to natural rights and the 
autonomy of the individual as legitimizing political authority, ultimately, the 
implications of the social contract will undermine those rights. If the foundation of 
society is rational agreement, then rights become arbitrary; they can merely be what 
the society has agreed to respect; they are not necessarily ‘natural’. Individual choice 
does not legitimize the contract; the contract legitimizes recognition of individual 
choice. Within a pragmatic society, appeals to “natural rights” and even freedom as 
intrinsically desirable are arbitrary outside a social contract. Ironically, the history 
and conception of the social contract itself opened up the possibility of such 
pragmatic notions. 
 
Without original principles as the origin of the contract, governance becomes a 
procedural mechanism rather than a consecration of natural rights. Common to the 
social contract theorists is the notion that the best way to form society consists in 
rational agreement. They differ in the purpose, necessity and scope of this agreement, 
yet they all perpetuate the notion of community being predicated upon a contract. 
Hobbes asserts that an agreement is necessary to refrain from violence and therefore 
create the peaceful conditions for community. Locke views agreement to respect 
property rights as essential in order to trust others and thus join in relationship with 
them. Rousseau expounds on the natural independence of man and how he only joins 
in society with others due to need and convenience. 
 
Girard’s Theory and Critique 
 
Our current intellectual tradition relies heavily on the social contract theorists in 
elucidating human nature and formation of societies, but this tradition leaves us dry. 
Rene Girard’s theories of mimetic desire and the scapegoat mechanism provide a 
more complete conception of these notions, providing us better resources for 
understanding our current political situation. 
 
Mimetic theory asserts that humans are imitative by nature; we borrow from those to 
whom we are exposed, particularly those closest to us. Thoughts, mannerisms, and 
                                                          
12 Ibid, 5. 
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especially desires are mimetic. Girard focuses on the latter, asserting that desire13 is not 
determined by ourselves; “we do not each have our own desire, one really our own”14. 
Desires do not arise individually; rather, they are predicated upon community.  
 
The mimetic nature of desire explains the need for the scapegoat mechanism. 
Through imitation, humans start adopting the same objects of desire. If the object is 
scarce, those who imitate each other and therefore desiring one and the same object 
become rivals.15 The multiplication and continuation of such rivalries has the 
potential for birthing a Hobbesian war of all against all. “Far from making ourselves 
independent and autonomous, we give ourselves over to never ending rivalries.”16  
 
The scapegoat mechanism is the means by which such a brutish existence is avoided. 
Rivalries are dispelled and peace is reinstated through the blaming of a member of 
society and their subsequent expulsion or murder. Girard explains in detail how 
archaic societies performed ritual sacrifice in an attempt to relieve the desires that 
caused tension in their communities. “Indeed, to escape from animal instinct… 
humans have to discipline their desire, and they cannot accomplish that except by 
means of sacrifices.”17 
 
According to Girard, the agreement upon which the social contract is predicated is not 
the product of consensus among autonomous individuals. Rather, the agreement is a 
product of the mimetic nature of humans and the scapegoat mechanism. Similarity in 
opinion is reached through imitation of opinion; therefore a consensus is likely to be 
based on communal desire rather than individual rationality. This directly discounts 
not only the theory of the foundation of society, but also Locke and Rousseau’s 
conceptions of the just methods of creating and promulgating law. Locke’s majority 
rule appears much less rational; granting power to mimetic mob mentality.18 
Rousseau’s general will is no better; the agreement of all is probably more indicative 
of the workings of mimetic desire and less indicative of the autonomy and 
individuality he holds as the foundation of the general will. Mimetic theory indicates 
that “this autonomy, however, is really nothing but a reflection of the illusions 
projected by our admiration for [those we imitate].”19 
                                                          
13 Girard asserts that desire, mimetic in nature, is distinguished from need. 
 
14 Girard, I See Satan Fall like Lightning, 15. 
 
15 Ibid, 14. 
 
16 Ibid. 
 
17 Ibid, 95. 
 
18 Perhaps this elucidates Tocqueville’s tyranny of the majority. 
19 Ibid. 
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This account of humans as mimetic beings implies that Rousseau was mistaken in his 
understanding of mankind as naturally independent. By nature, our desires are 
dependent on each other. Therefore, our choices are dependent on each other to some 
extent. Girard is adamant that “truly to desire, we must have recourse to people about 
us; we have to borrow their desires.”20 We lack the ability to want anything without 
any mimetic connection to others.21 Our imitative tendencies draw us into 
connections naturally, therefore the family is not the only natural society; every 
society is predicated upon the connections that arise out of imitation and form human 
culture. 
 
On Girard’s view, society is also predicated upon ritualistic sacrifice through the 
scapegoat mechanism. Though Hobbes was trying to bring about societal order by 
avoiding the controversial subjects of religion and ritual, he consequently missed the 
key to societal order itself. Order comes about by the release of mimetic tensions 
through the expulsion or sacrifice of a scapegoat. Rational agreement is an insufficient 
means to prevent or relieve tensions of desire. Hobbes does recognize the limits of such 
rationality due to man’s passionate nature, but the leviathan acting as a strong central 
authority is the means to bring order from human nature. According to Girard, this is 
not enough; the scapegoat mechanism must still be in operation. Religion, ritual, and 
tradition continue this mechanism in societies in some form or another.22 Hobbes’ early 
pragmatic tendencies caused him to reject any such religious principle. 
 
Mimetic theory also indicates that Locke was mistaken in his conception of property. 
Though Locke had some recognition of mimetic conflict resulting from disagreements 
over property, he didn’t see that a contracted agreement would lack the ability to 
prevent or dispel such conflict. In fact, forming a political community might even 
increase the occurrence of rivalries. Society brings individuals into relation with each 
other and highlights the desires for property in its desperate strivings to secure 
property rights. Materialistic desires might be introduced due to the emphasis the 
contract places on property rights. Furthermore, the pragmatic approach influenced by 
the social contract renders ‘natural’ property rights arbitrary; a clause in the malleable 
contract. A property right would only exist insofar as everyone agrees to respect it. 
 
The current pragmatic view of a contract that is changeable based on agreement has 
been informed by theorists who themselves were misinformed; they lacked the 
                                                                                                                                              
 
20 Ibid, 15. 
 
21 Granted, Girard’s theory has yet to be carefully qualified in terms of desires for food, sex, 
sleep, etc. He might qualify these as needs which have a non-imitative basis. 
 
22 It’s possible that this occurs in a non-violent manner. The Israelites, for example, used animal 
sacrifice as their method of enacting the scapegoat mechanism. 
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knowledge of humanity’s mimetic nature and society’s religious, ritualistic basis. This 
has created our current dilemma: we have disposed of the misguided principles behind 
the social contract, but have kept the procedural aspects of the contract which were 
originally founded upon those principles. If Girard is correct, we need to question the 
misunderstandings of human nature on which the social contract was founded. 
 
The Implications: Political Theology 
 
Political theology, in short, is the age-old method of basing governing structures and 
authority on divine principles. Lilla states our current condition in regards to political 
theology: 
  
“We in the West are disturbed and confused. Though we have our own 
fundamentalists, we find it incomprehensible that theological ideas still stir up 
messianic passions, leaving societies in ruin. We had assumed this was no 
longer possible, that human beings had learned to separate religious questions 
from political ones, that fanaticism was dead. We were wrong.”23 
 
He continues to argue that our lack of understanding is due to the influence of our 
political tradition, beginning with Hobbes. He views Rousseau’s partiality to and 
appreciation of religion as a preservational force for religious influence in politics.24 
This is true, but the pragmatic shift that the social contract thinkers set in motion has 
come to view religion and ritual in terms of its procedural value rather than its 
explanatory value. Mere religious influence in government is understood as 
pragmatically advantageous; the radical political theology in Islamic nations is not. 
Why is an approach which causes such conflict and contradicts our conception of a 
contract as the best way to proceed still so prevalent? Our pragmatic framework 
which conceives of a changeable social contract provides little explanation.  
 
Girard’s understanding of society as predicated upon religious ritual provides a 
comprehensive framework for understanding the continued presence of political 
theology. Given that human society is founded upon mimesis and ritual, it seems 
inconceivable that any society would be able to continue its existence without its 
religious and ritualistic framework which provides the occurrence of the scapegoat 
mechanism. In this sense, we are an anomaly; western political societies found a way 
to have such a framework apart from government. Lilla describes the American 
experience as “utterly exceptional: there is no other fully developed industrial society 
with a population so committed to its faiths (and such exotic ones), while being 
                                                          
23 Lilla, 1. 
 
24 Ibid, 6. 
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equally committed to the Great Separation.”25 We have embraced a social contract yet 
maintained a principled approach to it. 
 
Furthermore, the mimetic nature of humans renders a departure from strong, imitated 
principles ingrained in Islamic society highly unlikely. Their society is bonded 
through imitation and their communal ritualistic mechanisms. Again, American 
society is unique in its successful completion of this pragmatic move, but we 
shouldn’t assume that we have lost our imitative tendencies and need for the 
scapegoat mechanism; they have simply manifested themselves in different ways. A 
recognition of these tendencies in religion, politics, and popular culture will help us to 
end our flawed perception that humanity can ultimately progress beyond principles, 
beyond the needs which political theology fills.  
 
Our current procedural notions regarding government and society were originally 
founded upon the flawed principles presented and influenced by the social contract 
theorists. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau conceived of political societies as founded 
upon rational agreement; even Hobbes overestimated humanity’s autonomy and 
rationality. Girard’s theory concludes that such an understanding does not recognize 
the mimetic nature of humans and underestimates the role of ritual in the formation of 
society, and the continued need for such ritual. Ironically, the best way to proceed is 
only discovered or understood through a comprehension of Girard’s principles. 
Girard’s understanding illuminates the continuation of political theology, 
demonstrating that a complete move away from divine principles to rational 
procedures is difficult and unlikely given certain aspects of human nature: mimesis 
and the scapegoat mechanism. 
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